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Abstract
For languages which conform to classical logic such extensions are constructed that they
possess a consistent theory of truth. Every language, whose sentences have meanings
which make them either true or false, is shown to have an extension possessing a con-
sistent theory of truth when that extension is interpreted by meanings of its sentences.
1 Introduction
Based on ’Chomsky Definition’ (cf. [2]) we assume that a language is a countable set of
sentences with finite length, and formed by a countable set of elements. A theory of syntax
is also assumed to provide symbols and rules to construct well-formed sentences and possible
formulas for that language.
A language is said to conform to classical logic if it has, or if it can be extended to have the
following properties:
(i) It contains logical symbols ¬ (not), ∨ (or), ∧ (and), → (if...then), ↔ (if and only if), ∀
(for all) and ∃ (exists), and the following sentences: If A and B are (denote) sentences, so
are ¬A, A ∨ B, A ∧ B, A→ B and A↔ B. If P (x) is a formula of the language, then P is
called a predicate with domain DP if P (b) is a sentence of that language whenever b is a term
which names an object of DP . Denote by NP the set of those terms. ∀xP (x) and ∃xP (x) are
then sentences of the language. If P has several free variables x1, . . . , xm, then P (x1, . . . , xm)
is denoted by P (x), and the sentences ∀xP (x) and ∃xP (x) stand for universal and existential
closures ∀x1 · · · ∀xmP (x1, . . . , xm) and ∃x1 · · · ∃xmP (x1, . . . , xm).
(ii) The sentences of that language are so interpreted that the following rules of classical logic
hold (’iff’ means ’if and only if’): If A and B denote sentences of the language, then A is true
iff ¬A is false, and A is false iff ¬A is true; A ∨ B is true iff A or B is true, and false iff A
and B are false; A ∧ B is true iff A and B are true, and false iff A or B is false; A → B is
true iff A is false or B is true, and false iff A is true and B is false; A↔ B is true iff A and B
are both true or both false, and false iff A is true and B is false or A is false and B is true. If
P is a predicate with domain DP , then ∀xP (x) is true iff P (b) is true for every b ∈ NP , and
false iff P (b) is false for some b ∈ NP ; ∃xP (x) is true iff P (b) is true for some b ∈ NP , and
false iff P (b) is false for every b ∈ NP .
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(iii) The language is bivalent: Every sentence of it is either true or false.
Main results of this paper are:
Every language which conforms to classical logic has an extension which has properties (i)–
(iii), and for which a consistent theory of truth is formulated.
Languages, whose sentences have meanings which make them either true or false, have ex-
tensions which possess a consistent theory of truth, and are interpreted by meanings of their
sentences.
2 Extended languages
Assume that an object language L0 conforms to classical logic, and is without a truth predi-
cate. Property (iii) is then necessarily valid, and sentences of L0 have to obey rules of classical
logic.
The basic extension L of L0 is constructed as follows: Sentences ¬A, A ∨B, A ∧B, A→ B,
A ↔ B, ∀xP (x) and ∃xP (x), where A and B go through all sentences of L0 and P its
predicates, are added if they are not in L0, and interpreted so that properties (ii) hold.
Denote by L1 the so extended language. It has properties (ii) and (iii).
Replacing L0 by L1 and so on, we obtain a sequence of languages Ln, n ∈ N0 = {0, 1, 2, . . .},
whose sentences are so interpreted that the properties (ii) and (iii) are valid. This holds also
for the union L of languages Ln, n ∈ N0, which is the basic extension of L0.
If A and B denote sentences of L, there exist n1 and n2 such that A is in Ln1 and B is in
Ln2 . Denoting n = max{n1, n2}, then A and B are sentences of Ln. Thus the sentences ¬A,
A ∨ B, A ∧ B, A → B and A ↔ B are in Ln+1, and hence in L. If P is a predicate of L0,
then the sentences ∀xP (x) and ∃xP (x) are in L1, so that they are in in L. Thus L has also
the syntactic properties (i), whence it has properties (i) – (iii).
The language LT is formed by adding to L an extra formula T (x) and sentences T (n), where
n goes through all numerals which denote numbers n ∈ N0. Numerals are also added, if
necessary, to terms of LT . Choose a Go¨del numbering to sentences of LT . The Go¨del number
of a sentence (denoted by) A is denoted by #A, and the numeral of #A by ⌈A⌉, which names
the sentence A.
Denote by L0 the language containing LT , and sentences ∀xT (x), ∃xT (x), ∀xT (⌈T (x)⌉),
∃xT (⌈T (x)⌉), and sentences ∀xT (⌈P (x)⌉) and ∃xT (⌈P (x)⌉) for every predicate P of L.
If P is a predicate of L with domain DP , then P (b) is a sentence of L for each b ∈ NP ,
and ⌈P (b)⌉ is the numeral of its Go¨del number. Thus T (⌈P (b)⌉) is a sentence of L0 for each
b ∈ NP , whence T (⌈P (·)⌉) is a predicate of L0 with domain DP .
When a language Ln, n ∈ N0, is defined, let Ln+1 be a language which is formed by adding
to Ln those of the following sentences which are not in Ln: ¬A, A ∨ B, A ∧ B, A → B and
A↔ B, where A and B go through all sentences of Ln.
The language L is defined as the union of languages Ln, n ∈ N0. Extend the Go¨del numbering
of the sentences of LT to the sentences of L, and denote by D the set of those Go¨del numbers.
Denote by P the set of all predicates of L. Divide P into three disjoint subsets.

P1 = {P ∈ P : P (b) is a true sentence of L for every b ∈ NP},
P2 = {P ∈ P : P (b) is a false sentence of L for every b ∈ NP},
P3 = {P ∈ P : P (b) is a true sentence of L for some but not for all b ∈ NP}.
(2.1)
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Define subsets Z1(U), Z2(U), U ⊂ D, and Zi, i = 1 . . . 4, of L by


Z1(U) = {T (n): n = ⌈A⌉, where A is a sentence of L and #A is in U},
Z2(U) = {¬T (n): n = ⌈A⌉, where A is a sentence of L and #[¬A] is in U},
Z1 = {¬∀xT (x), ∃xT (x),¬(∀xT (⌈T (x)⌉)), ∃xT (⌈T (x)⌉)},
Z2 = {∀xT (⌈P (x)⌉), ∃xT (⌈P (x)⌉) : P ∈ P1},
Z3 = {¬(∀xT (⌈P (x)⌉)),¬(∃xT (⌈P (x)⌉)) : P ∈ P2},
Z4 = {¬(∀xT (⌈P (x)⌉)), ∃xT (⌈P (x)⌉) : P ∈ P3}.
(2.2)
Subsets Ln(U), n ∈ N0, of L are defined recursively as follows.
L0(U) =
{
Z = {A : A is a true sentence of L} if U = ∅ (the empty set),
Z ∪ Z1(U) ∪ Z2(U) ∪ Z1 ∪ Z2 ∪ Z3 ∪ Z4 if ∅ ⊂ U ⊂ D.
(2.3)
When n ∈ N0, and a subset Ln(U) of L is defined, define

L0n(U) = {¬(¬A) : A is in Ln(U)},
L1n(U) = {A ∨ B : A or B is in Ln(U)},
L2n(U) = {A ∧ B : A and B are in Ln(U)},
L3n(U) = {A→ B : ¬A or B is in Ln(U)},
L4n(U) = {A↔ B : both A and B or both ¬A and ¬B are in Ln(U)},
L5n(U) = {¬(A ∨ B) : ¬A and ¬B are in Ln(U)},
L6n(U) = {¬(A ∧ B) : ¬A or ¬B is in Ln(U)},
L7n(U) = {¬(A→ B) : A and ¬B are in Ln(U)},
L8n(U) = {¬(A↔ B) : A and ¬B, or ¬A and B are in Ln(U)},
(2.4)
and
Ln+1(U) = Ln(U) ∪
8⋃
k=0
Lkn(U). (2.5)
The above constructions imply that Ln(U) ⊆ Ln+1(U) ⊂ L and L
k
n(U) ⊆ L
k
n+1(U) for all
n ∈ N0 and k = 0, . . . , 8. Define subsets L(U) and Q(U) of L by
L(U) =
∞⋃
n=0
Ln(U) and Q(U) = {A : ¬A ∈ L(U)}. (2.6)
3 Properties of consistent subsets of D
Recall that D denotes the set of Go¨del numbers of the sentences of L.
Denote by G(U) the set Go¨del numbers of sentences of L(U) defined by (2.6):
G(U) = {#A : A is a sentence of L(U)}. (3.1)
A subset U of D is said to be consistent if there is no sentence A in L such that both #A
and #[¬A] are in U .
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Lemma 3.1. Let U be a consistent subset of D. Then for no sentence A of L(U) both A and
¬A belong to L(U), and G(U) is consistent.
Proof. We shall first show that for no sentence A of L(U) both A and ¬A belong to L(U).
If U = ∅, then L0(U) is the set Z of true sentences of L. If A is in Z, then ¬A is false, and
hence not in Z = L0(U), since L has properties (i)–(iii).
Assume next that U is nonempty.
Let n be a numeral. If T (n) is in L0(U), it is in Z1(U), so that, by (2.2), n = ⌈A⌉, where
#A is in U . Since U is consistent, then #[¬A] is not in U . Thus, by (2.2), ¬T (n) is not in
Z2(U), and hence not in L0(U). This implies also that if ¬T (n) is in L0(U), then T (n) is not
in L0(U).
U is nonempty and as a consistent set a proper subset of D. Thus (2.2) and (2.3) imply
that ∃xT (x) and ¬∀xT (x) are in L0(U), but ¬∃xT (x) and ∀xT (x) are not in L0(U). More-
over, ∃xT (⌈T (x)⌉) and ¬∀xT (⌈T (x)⌉) are in Z1, and hence in L0(U), but ¬∃xT (⌈T (x)⌉) and
∀xT (⌈T (x)⌉) are not in L0(U).
By the definitions of Z2, Z3, Z4 and L0(U) neither both ∃xT (⌈P (x)⌉) and ¬(∃xT (⌈P (x)⌉),
nor both ∀xT (⌈P (x)⌉) and ¬(∀xT (⌈P (x)⌉), are in L0(U) for any predicate P ∈ P.
The above proof shows that for no sentence A of L both A and ¬A belong to L0(U).
Make the induction hypothesis: There exists an n ∈ N0 such that
(h0) For no sentence A of L both A and ¬A belong to Ln(U).
If ¬(¬A) is in Ln+1(U), it is in L
0
n(U), so that A is in Ln(U). Thus, by (h0), ¬A is not in
Ln(U) so that ¬(¬(¬A)), is not in L
0
n(U), and hence not in Ln+1(U).
If A ∨ B is in Ln+1(U), then it is in L
1
n(U), so that A or B is in Ln(U). ¬(A ∨ B) is in
Ln+1(U), if it is in L
5
n(U), in which case ¬A and ¬B are in Ln(U). These results and (h0)
imply that A ∨ B and ¬(A ∨B) are not both in Ln+1(U).
A∧B and ¬(A∧B) cannot both be in Ln+1(U), for otherwise A∧B is in L
2
n(U), i.e., both A
and B are in Ln(U), and ¬(A ∧ B) is in L
6
n(U), i.e., at least one of ¬A and ¬B is in Ln(U).
Thus both A and ¬A or both B and ¬B are in Ln(U), contradicting with (h0).
If A → B is in Ln+1(U), then it is in L
3
n(U), so that ¬A or B is in Ln(U). ¬(A → B) is in
Ln+1(U) if it is in L
7
n(U), so that and both A and ¬B are in Ln(U). Because of these results
and (h0) either A→ B or ¬(A→ B) is not in Ln+1(U).
A↔ B is Ln+1(U), if it is in L
4
n(U), in which case both A and B or both ¬A and ¬B are in
Ln(U). If ¬(A↔ B) is in Ln+1(U), then it is in L
8
n(U), whence both A and ¬B or both ¬A
and B are in Ln(U). Thus both A↔ B and ¬(A↔ B) cannot be in Ln+1(U), for otherwise
both A and ¬A or both B and ¬B are in Ln(U), contradicting with (h0).
Because Ln+1(U) = Ln(U)∪
⋃8
k=0 L
k
n(U), the above results and the induction hypothesis (h0)
imply that for no sentence A of L both A and ¬A belong to Ln+1(U).
Since (h0) is true when n = 0, it is by induction true for every n ∈ N0.
If A and ¬A are in L(U), then by (2.6) A is in Ln1(U) for some n1 ∈ N0, and ¬A is in
Ln2(U) for some n2 ∈ N0. Then both A and ¬A are in Ln(U) when n = max{n1, n2}. This
is impossible, because (h0) is true for every n ∈ N0. Thus A and ¬A cannot both be in L(U)
for any sentence of L.
The above result and (3.1) imply that there is no sentence A in L such that that both #A
and #[¬A] are in G(U). Thus G(U) is consistent.
Lemma 3.2. Assume that U and V are consistent subsets of D, and that V ⊆ U . Then
G(V ) ⊆ G(U).
4
Proof. As consistent sets both V and U are proper subsets of D. We shall first show that
L(V ) ⊆ L(U).
If V = ∅, then L0(V ) = Z ⊆ L0(U).
Assume next that V is nonempty. Thus also U is nonempty.
Let A be a sentence of L. Definition of L0(U) implies that A is in L0(U) and also in L0(V )
iff A is in Z.
Let n be a numeral. If T (n) is in L0(V ), it is in Z1(V ), so that n = ⌈A⌉, where #A is in V .
Because V ⊆ U , then #A is also in U , whence T (n) is in Z1(U), and hence in L0(U).
¬T (n) is in L0(V ) if it is in Z2(V ), in which case n = ⌈A⌉, where #¬A] is in V . Since V ⊆ U ,
then #[¬A] is also in U , whence ¬T (n) is in Z2(U), and hence in L0(U).
Because U and V are nonempty and proper subsets of D, then Z1, Z2, Z3 and Z4 are in L0(U)
and in L0(V ).
The above results imply that L0(V ) ⊆ L0(U). Make the induction hypothesis:
(h1) Ln(V ) ⊆ Ln(U).
The definitions of the sets Lkn(U), k = 0, . . . , 8, given in (2.4), together with (h1), imply that
Lkn(V ) ⊆ L
k
n(U) for each k = 0, . . . , 8. Thus
Ln+1(V ) = Ln(V ) ∪
8⋃
k=0
Lkn(V ) ⊆ Ln(U) ∪
8⋃
k=0
Lkn(U) = Ln+1(U).
Because (h1) is true when n = 0, then it is true for every n ∈ N0.
If A is in L(V ), it is by (2.6) in Ln(V ) for some n ∈ N0. Thus A is in Ln(U) by (h1), and
hence in L(U). Consequently, L(V ) ⊆ L(U).
If #A is in G(V ) then A is in L(V ) by (3.1). Thus A is in L(U), so that #A is in G(U) by
(3.1). This shows that G(V ) ⊆ G(U).
Denote by C the family of consistent subsets of D. In the formulation and the proof of
Theorem 3.1 below transfinite sequences indexed by ordinals are used. A transfinite sequence
(Uλ)λ<α of C is said to be increasing if Uµ ⊆ Uν whenever µ < ν < α, and strictly increasing
if Uµ ⊂ Uν whenever µ < ν < α.
Lemma 3.3. Assume that (Uλ)λ<α a strictly increasing sequence of C. Then
(a) (G(Uλ))λ<α is an increasing sequence of C.
(b) The set Uα =
⋃
λ<α
G(Uλ) is consistent.
Proof. (a) Consistency of the sets G(Uλ), λ < α, follows from Lemma 3.1 because the sets
Uλ, λ < α, are consistent.
Because Uµ ⊂ Uν whenever µ < ν < α, then G(Uµ) ⊆ G(Uν) whenever µ < ν < α, by Lemma
3.2, whence the sequence (G(Uλ))λ<α is increasing. This proves (a).
To prove that the set
⋃
λ<α
G(Uλ) is consistent, assume on the contrary that there exists such a
sentence A in L that both #A and #[¬A] are in
⋃
λ<α
G(Uλ). Thus there exist µ, ν < α such
that #A is in G(Uµ) and #[¬A] is in G(Uν). Because G(Uµ) ⊆ G(Uν) or G(Uν) ⊆ G(Uµ), then
both #A and #[¬A] are in G(Uµ) or in G(Uν). But this is impossible, since both G(Uµ) and
G(Uν) are consistent by (a). Thus, the set
⋃
λ<α
G(Uλ) is consistent. This proves the conclusion
of (b).
Now we are ready to prove the following Theorem.
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Theorem 3.1. Let W denote the set of Go¨del numbers of true sentences of L. We say that
a transfinite sequence (Uλ)λ<α of C is a G-sequence if it has the following properties.
(G) (Uλ)λ<α is strictly increasing, U0 = W , and if 0 < µ < α, then Uµ =
⋃
λ<µ
G(Uλ).
Then the longest G-sequence exists. It has the last member, which is the smallest consistent
subset U of D which satisfies U = G(U).
Proof. W is consistent, since L has properties (i)-(iii).
We shall first show that G-sequences are nested:
(1) Assume that (Uλ)λ<α and (Vλ)λ<β are G-sequences. Then Uλ = Vλ when λ < min{α, β}.
Assume on the contrary that (1) does not hold. Then ν = min{λ : Uλ 6= Vλ} exists by
[5, Theorem 6.2.6 (d)]. 0 < ν, since U0 = W = V0, and Uλ = Vλ when λ < ν. Thus, by (G),
Uν =
⋃
λ<ν
G(Uλ) =
⋃
λ<ν
G(Uλ) = Vν . But Uν 6= Vν by the choice of ν; a contradiction.
Let (Uλ)λ<α be a G-sequence. Defining f(0) = minU0, f(λ) = min(Uλ/Uλ−1), 0 < λ < α,
and f(α) = min(N0/D), we obtain a bijection f from [0, α] to a subset of N0. Thus α is
a countable ordinal. Consequently, the set Γ of those ordinals α for which (Uλ)λ<α is a G-
sequence is bounded from above by the smallest uncountable ordinal. Denote by γ the least
upper bound of Γ.
To show that γ is a successor, assume on the contrary that γ is a limit ordinal. Given µ < γ,
then ν = µ + 1 and α = ν + 1 are < γ. (Uλ)λ<α is a G-sequence, whence Uµ =
⋃
λ<µ
G(Uλ),
and Uµ ⊂ Uµ+1. Thus (Uλ)λ<γ is a strictly increasing sequence of C, and properties (G) hold
when α = γ, so that (Uλ)λ<γ is a G-sequence. Denote Uγ =
⋃
λ<γ
G(Uλ). Uγ is consistent by
Lemma 3.3(b). Moreover, Uµ ⊂ Uν =
⋃
λ<ν
G(Uλ) ⊆ Uγ . This is true for each µ < γ, whence
(Uλ)λ<γ+1 is a G-sequence. This is impossible, since (Uλ)λ<γ contains all G-sequences.
Thus γ is a successor, say γ = α+ 1. If λ < α, then Uλ ⊂ Uα, so that G(Uλ) ⊆ G(Uα). Then
Uα =
⋃
λ<α
G(Uλ) ⊆
⋃
λ<γ
G(Uλ) = G(Uα), whence Uα ⊆ G(Uα). Moreover, Uα = G(Uα),
for otherwise Uα ⊂ G(Uα) =
⋃
λ<γ
G(Uλ) = Uγ , and (Uλ)λ<γ+1 would be a G-sequence.
Consequently, (Uλ)λ<γ is the longest G-sequence, Uα is its last member, and Uα = G(Uα).
Let U be a consistent subset of D satisfying U = G(U). Then U0 =W = G(∅) ⊆ G(U) = U .
Make the induction hypothesis:
(h2) There exists an ordinal µ which satisfies 0 < µ < γ such that Uλ ⊆ U for each λ < µ.
Then G(Uλ) ⊆ G(U) for each λ < µ, whence Uµ =
⋃
λ<µ
G(Uλ) ⊆ G(U) = U . Thus, by
transfinite induction, Uµ ⊆ U for each µ < γ. In particular, Uα ⊆ U . This proves the last
assertion of Theorem.
4 Language LT and its properties
Let L0, L, L and D be as in Section 2, and let the subsets L(U) and Q(U) of L, and the
subsets G(U), U ⊂ D, of D be defined by (2.6) and (3.1). Recall that a subset U of D is
consistent if there is no sentence A in L such that both #A and #[¬A] are in U . By Theorem
3.1 the smallest consistent subset of D which satisfies U = G(U) exits.
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Definition 4.1. Let U be the smallest consistent subset of D which satisfies U = G(U).
Denote by LT the language formed by the object language L0, and those sentences of L(U)
and Q(U) and those symbols, formulas and predicates of L0 which are not in L0. For the
predicate T determined by the formula T (x) the domain and the set of terms are defined by
DT = {the sentences of LT} and NT = {n : n = ⌈A⌉ , where A is in DT}. (4.1)
An interpretation of LT is defined as follows.
(I) A sentence of LT is interpreted as true iff it is in L(U), and as false iff it is in Q(U).
Lemma 4.1. The language LT defined by Definition 4.1 and interpreted by (I) is bivalent.
Proof. The subsets L(U) and Q(U) of the sentences of LT are disjoint. For otherwise there
is a sentence A of LT which is in L(U) ∩ Q(U). Then A is in L(U), and by the definition
(2.6) of Q(U) also ¬A is in L(U). But this is impossible by Lemma 3.1. Consequently,
L(U) ∩Q(U) = ∅.
If A be a sentence of LT , then it is in L(U) or in Q(U). If A is true, then it is in L(U), but
not in Q(U), and hence not false, because L(U) ∩ Q(U) = ∅. Similarly, if A is false, it is in
Q(U), but not in L(U), and hence not true. Consequently, A is either true or false, so that
LT is bivalent.
Lemma 4.2. Let LT be defined by Definition 4.1 and interpreted by (I). Then a sentence of
the basic extension L of L0 is true (respectively false) in the interpretation of L iff it is true
(respectively false) in the interpretation (I).
Proof. Let A denote a sentence of L. A is true in the interpretation (I) iff A is in L(U) iff
(by the construction of L(U)) A is in Z iff A is true in the interpretation of L. A is false in
the interpretation (I) iff A is in Q(U) iff (by (2.6)) ¬A is in L(U) iff (¬A is a sentence of L)
¬A is in Z iff ¬A is true in the interpretation of L iff (L has properties (i)–(iii)) A is false in
the interpretation of L.
Lemma 4.3. The language LT defined by Definition 4.1 and interpreted by (I) satisfies the
rules (ii) of classical logic given in Introduction.
Proof. The interpretation rules given in (ii) contain the following rules, where A and B denote
arbitrary sentences of LT .
(t1) Negation: A is true iff ¬A is false, and A is false iff ¬A is true.
(t2) Disjunction: A ∨B is true iff A or B is true. A ∨ B false iff A and B are false.
(t3) Conjunction: A ∧ B is true iff A and B are true. A ∧B is false iff A or B is false.
(t4) Conditional: A→ B is true iff A is false or B is true. A→ B is false iff A is true and
B is false.
(t5) Biconditional: A↔ B is true iff A and B are both true or both false. A↔ B is false
iff A is true and B is false or A is false and B is true.
We shall first derive the following auxiliary rule.
(t0) Double negation: If A is a sentence of LT , then ¬(¬A) is true iff A is true.
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To prove (t0), assume first that ¬(¬A) is true. Then ¬(¬A) is in L(U). By (2.6) ¬(¬A) is in
Ln(U) for some n ∈ N0. If ¬(¬A) is in L0(U) then ¬(¬A) is in Z, so that sentence ¬(¬A) is
true in the interpretation of L. This holds (negation rule is valid in L) iff ¬A is false in the
interpretation of L iff A is true in the interpretation of L. Thus A is in Z ⊂ L(U), whence A
is true.
Assume next that n ∈ N0 is the smallest number for which ¬(¬A) is in Ln+1(U). It then
follows from (2.5) that ¬(¬A) is in L0n(U), so that A is by (2.4) in Ln(U), and hence in L(U),
i.e., A is true.
Thus A is true if ¬(¬A) is true.
Conversely, assume that A is true. Then A is in L(U), so that A is in Ln(U) for some n ∈ N0.
Thus ¬(¬A) is in L0n(U), and hence in Ln+1(U). Consequently, ¬(¬A) is in L(U), whence
¬(¬A) is true. This concludes the proof of (t0).
Rule (t0) is applied to prove negation rule (t1). Let A be a sentence of LT . Then A is true
iff (by (t0)) ¬(¬A) is true iff ¬(¬A) is in L(U) iff (by (2.6)) ¬A is in Q(U) iff ¬A is false.
A is false iff A is in Q(U) iff (by (2.6)) ¬A is in L(U) iff ¬A is true. Thus (t1) is satisfied.
Next we shall prove rule (t3). Let A and B be sentences of LT . If A and B are true, i.e., A
and B are in L(U), there is by (2.6) an n ∈ N0 such that A and B are in Ln(U). Thus A∧B
is in L2n(U), and hence in L(U), so that A ∧B is true.
Conversely, assume that A ∧ B is true, or equivalently, A ∧ B is in L(U). Then there is by
(2.6) an n ∈ N0 such that A ∧B is in Ln(U). If A ∧B is in L0(U), it is in Z. Thus A ∧B is
true in the interpretation of L. Because rule (t3) is valid in L, then A and B are true in the
interpretation of L, and hence also in the interpretation (I) by Lemma 4.2.
Assume next that n ∈ N0 is the smallest number for which A∧B is in Ln+1(U). Then A∧B
is in L2n(U), so that A and B are in Ln(U), and hence in L(U), i.e., A and B are true.
The above reasoning proves that the first sentence of (t3) holds. This result and the bivalence
of LT , proved in Lemma 4.1, imply that the second sentence of (t3) is also valid. Consequently,
rule (t3) is valid.
The proofs of rules (t2), (t4) and (t5) are similar to the above proof of (t3).
Every predicate P of L is interpreted so that ∃xP (x) and ∀xP (x) have properties required in
(ii). Next we shall show that ∃xT (x) and ∀xT (x) have those properties, i.e.,
(t6) ∃xT (x) is true iff T (n) is true for some n ∈ NT .
∃xT (x) is false iff T (n) is false for every n ∈ NT .
(t7) ∀xT (x) is true iff T (n) is true for every n ∈ NT .
∀xT (x) is false iff T (n) is false for some n ∈ NT .
Because U is nonempty, then ∃xT (x) is in L0(U) by (2.2) and (2.3), and hence in L(U) by
(2.6). Thus ∃xT (x) is by (I) a true sentence of LT .
T (n) is for each n ∈ NT a sentence of LT . If #A1 is in G(U) = U , then T (n) is by (2.2) in
Z1(U), and hence in L(U) when n = ⌈A1⌉. This result, (I), and Lemma 4.1 imply that T (n)
is true when n = ⌈A1⌉, and hence, by (4.1), true for some n ∈ NT .
The above results imply that the first sentence of rule (t6) holds. As a consequence of this
and the bivalence of LT , proved in Lemma 4.1, also the second sentence of (t6) is valid.
¬∀xT (x) is in L0(U), and hence in L(U), so that it is true. Thus ∀xT (x) is false by (t1).
If #[¬A2] is in G(U) = U , then ¬T (n) is by (2.2) in Z2(U) ⊂ L(U), and hence true when
n = ⌈A2⌉. Thus T (n) is by (t1) false when n = ⌈A2⌉, and hence false for some n ∈ NT .
As a consequence of the above results the second sentence of rule (t7) is valid. This result
and the bivalence of LT imply the validity of the second sentence of (t7).
It remains to show that the following rules hold.
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(tt6) ∃xT (⌈T (x)⌉) is true iff T (⌈T (n)⌉) is true for some n ∈ NT .
∃xT (⌈T (x)⌉) is false iff T (⌈T (n)⌉) is false for every n ∈ NT .
(tt7) ∀xT (⌈T (x)⌉) is true iff T (⌈T (n)⌉) is true for every n ∈ NT .
∀xT (⌈T (x)⌉) is false iff T (⌈T (n)⌉) is false for some n ∈ NT .
If P is a predicate of L with domain DP , then
(tp6) ∃xT (⌈P (x)⌉) is true iff T (⌈P (b)⌉) is true for some b ∈ NP .
∃xT (⌈P (x)⌉) is false iff T (⌈P (b)⌉) is false for every b ∈ NP .
(tp7) ∀xT (⌈P (x)⌉) is true iff T (⌈P (b)⌉) is true for every b ∈ NP .
∀xT (⌈P (x)⌉) is false iff T (⌈P (b)⌉) is false for some b ∈ NP .
To begin with properties (tp6) and (tp7), consider first the case when P ∈ P1. Then P (b) is
a true sentence of L for every b ∈ NP . Since U is nonempty and proper subset of D, then
∃xT (⌈P (x)⌉) and ∀xT (⌈P (x)⌉) are in L0(U) by (2.2) and (2.3), and hence in L(U). Thus
∃xT (⌈P (x)⌉) and ∀xT (⌈P (x)⌉) are by (I) and Lemma 4.1 true sentences of LT .
The above results imply that the first sentences of properties (tp6) and (tp7) hold when P
is in P1. Because L is bivalent, then the second sentences of these properties are also valid.
The proof in the case when P is in P2 is similar.
Assume next that P is in P3. Then P (b) is a true sentence of L for some b ∈ NP , say b ∈ N
1
P ,
and a false sentence of L for b ∈ N2P = NP \N
1
P . Since U is nonempty, then ∃xT (⌈P (x)⌉) and
¬(∀xT (⌈P (x)⌉)) are in Z4 by (2.2), and hence in L(U) by (2.3) and (2.6). Thus ∃xT (⌈P (x)⌉)
is true, and and ∀xT (⌈P (x)⌉) is false.
Since every true sentence of L is by Lemma 4.2 a true sentence of LT and every false sentence
of L is a false sentence of LT , then, by the interpretation (I), #P (b) is in G(U) = U for every
b ∈ N1P , and #[¬P (b)] is in G(U) = U for every b ∈ N
2
P . But then, by (2.2), T (⌈P (b)⌉) is
in Z1(U), and hence in L(U), for every b ∈ N
1
P , and ¬T (⌈P (b)⌉) is in Z2(U), and hence in
L(U), for every b ∈ N2P . Thus, by (I) and Lemma 4.1, T (⌈P (b)⌉) is true for every b ∈ N
1
P ,
and T (⌈P (b)⌉) is false for every b ∈ N2P .
It follows the above results that the first sentence of (tp6) and the second sentence of (tp7)
are valid when P is in P3. The second sentence of (tp6) and the first sentence of (tp7) are
then also valid because LT is bivalent.
The proof of properties (tt6) and (tt7) is similar to that given above for properties (tp6) and
(tp7) in the case when P is in P3. This concludes the proof.
5 A consistent theory of truth
Now we are ready to prove our main results. First we shall formulate a theory of truth for
the language LT in the case when it is interpreted by (I).
Theorem 5.1. Assume that an object language L0 is without a truth predicate and conforms
to classical logic. Then the extension LT of L0, defined by Definition 4.1 and interpreted by
(I), has properties (i)-(iii) given in Introduction. The sentence A ↔ T (⌈A⌉) is true and the
sentence A ↔ ¬T (⌈A⌉) is false for every sentence A of LT . T is a truth predicate for LT ,
and the so obtained theory of truth for LT is consistent, i.e., free from contradictions.
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Proof. It follows from the construction of LT that it has syntactic properties (i) given in
Introduction. Properties (ii) and (iii) are satisfied by Lemma 4.2 and Lemma 4.3.
Let A denote a sentence of LT . The interpretation (I), rule (t1), the definitions of Z1(U),
Z2(U) and G(U), and the assumption U = G(U) in Definition 4.1 imply that
A is true iff A is in L(U) iff #A is in G(U) = U iff T (⌈A⌉) is in Z1(U) ⊂ L(U) iff T (⌈A⌉) is
true and ¬T (⌈A⌉) is false.
A is false iff A is in Q(U) iff ¬A is in L(U) iff #[¬A] is in G(U) = U iff ¬T (⌈A⌉) is in
Z2(U) ⊂ L(U) iff ¬T (⌈A⌉) is true and T (⌈A⌉) is false.
The above results and biconditional rule (t5) imply that the sentence A ↔ T (⌈A⌉) is true
and the sentence A↔ ¬T (⌈A⌉) is false for every sentence A of LT .
T is by Lemma 4.3 a predicate of LT , and the domain DT of T is the set all sentences of LT .
Thus DT satisfies the condition presented in [3, p. 7] for the domains of truth predicates.
Consequently, T is a truth predicate for LT .
The so obtained theory of truth for LT is consistent, since LT has properties (i)–(iii).
Next we shall consider the case where the sentences of LT are interpreted by their meanings.
Lemma 5.1. Assume that L0 is a language whose sentences have meanings which make them
either true or false, and which has not a truth predicate. The the sentences of the basic
extension L of L0 constructed in Section 2, and the sentences of LT defined in Definition 4.1
are interpreted by their meanings when the logical symbols are interpreted by their standard
meanings, and the sentence T (⌈A⌉) is interpreted as ’the sentence denoted by A is true’.
Moreover, L has properties (i)–(iii) in that interpretation, and L0 conforms to classical logic.
Proof. Let L0 be a language whose sentences have meanings which make them either true or
false. This bivalence remains valid for sentences of the basic extension L, when its sentences
are interpreted by meanings. Moreover, L has syntactical properties (i), and rules (ii) are
valid because they assign standard meanings to logical symbols. Thus the object language
L0 has an extension L whose sentences have meanings which make them either true or false,
which is without a truth predicate, and which has properties (i)–(iii). This implies that L0
conforms to classical logic. The language LT is also interpreted by meanings of its sentences
when T (⌈A⌉) means: ’the sentence denoted by A is true’, and logical symbols have their
standard meanings.
Lemma 5.2. Assume that languages L and LT and their interpretations are as in Lemma
5.1. Let W be the set of Go¨del numbers of true sentences of L, and let U be the smallest subset
of D for which U = G(U). Given a consistent subset V of D which satisfies W ⊆ V ⊆ U ,
assume that every sentence of LT whose Go¨del number is in V is true and not false by its
meaning. Then every sentence of L(V ) is true and not false by its meaning.
Proof. Because V ⊆ U = G(U), then every sentence whose Go¨del number is in V , is in LT .
We shall first prove that every sentence of L0(V ) is true and not false by its meaning.
Since W ⊆ V , then every true sentence of L, i.e., every sentence of Z is true and not false by
its meaning.
Given a sentence of LT , it is in Z1(V ) iff it is of the form T (⌈A⌉), where A denotes a sentence
whose Go¨del number is in V . A is by an assumption true and not false by its meaning. Thus
the sentence T (⌈A⌉), i.e., the sentence ’the sentence denoted by A is true’, and hence the
given sentence, is true and not false by its meaning. Replacing A by T (⌈A⌉), it follows that
T (⌈T (⌈A⌉)⌉) is true and not false by its meaning.
A given sentence of LT is in Z2(V ) iff it is of the form ¬T (⌈A⌉), where A denotes a sentence
of L, and the Go¨del number of the sentence ¬A is in V . ¬A is by a hypothesis true and not
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false by its meaning, and hence A is false and not true by its meaning. Thus the sentence
T (⌈A⌉), i.e., the sentence ’the sentence denoted by A is true’, is false and not true by its
meaning. Replacing A by T (⌈A⌉), we then obtain that T (⌈T (⌈A⌉)⌉) is false and not true by
its meaning. Consequently, by the standard meaning of negation, the sentences ¬T (⌈A⌉) and
¬T (⌈T (⌈A⌉)⌉) are true and not false by their meanings.
The set NT of numerals, defined by (4.1), contains ⌈A⌉ for every sentence A of LT . If #A is
in V , then the sentences T (⌈A⌉) and T (⌈T (⌈A⌉)⌉) are by a result proved above true and not
false by their meanings. Thus T (n) and T (⌈T (n)⌉) are for some n ∈ NT true and not false by
their meanings. These results and the standard meaning of the existential quantifier imply
that ∃xT (x) and ∃xT (⌈T (x)⌉) are true and not false by their meanings.
If #[¬A] is in V , then by a result proved above the sentences ¬T (⌈A⌉) and ¬T (⌈T (⌈A⌉)⌉)
are true and not false by their meanings. Thus the sentences ¬T (n) and ¬T (⌈T (n)⌉) are
for some n ∈ NT true and not false by their meanings, so that T (n) and T (⌈T (n)⌉) are for
some n ∈ NT false and not true by their meanings. The above results, the meaning of T ,
and the standard meanings of the universal quantifier and negation imply that ¬∀xT (x) and
¬∀xT (⌈T (x)⌉) are true and not false by their meanings. Consequently, the sentences of Z1
are true and not false by their meanings.
Let P be a predicate of L with domain DP . Language L, interpreted by meanings of its
sentences, has properties (i)–(iii). Thus P (b) is for every b ∈ NP , as a sentence of L, either
true and not false, or false and not true by its meaning. This property holds, because of the
meaning of T , for sentences T (⌈P (b)⌉), b ∈ NP . By taking also the meanings of the existential
and universal quantifiers and negation into account, it follows that the sentences of Z2, Z3
and Z4 are true and not false by their meanings.
The above results and the definition (2.3) of L0(V ) imply that every sentence of L0(V ) is true
and not false by its meaning. Thus the following property holds when n = 0.
(h3) Every sentence of Ln(V ) is true and not false by its meaning.
Make the induction hypothesis: (h3) holds for some n ∈ N0.
Given a sentence of L0n(V ), it is of the form ¬(¬A), where A is in Ln(V ). A is by (h3) true
and not false by its meaning. Thus, by standard meaning of negation, its double application
implies that the sentence ¬(¬A), and hence the given sentence, is true and not false by its
meaning.
A sentence is in L1n(V ) iff it is of the form A∨B, where A or B is in Ln(V ). By (h3) at least
one of the sentences A and B is true and not false by its meaning. Thus, by the the standard
meaning of disjunction, the sentence A ∨ B, and hence given sentence, is true and not false
by its meaning.
Similarly it can be shown that if (h3) holds, then every sentence of Lkn(V ), where 2 ≤ k ≤ 8,
is true and not false by its meaning.
The above results imply that under the induction hypothesis (h3) every sentence of Lkn(V ),
where 0 ≤ k ≤ 8, is true and not false by its meaning.
It then follows from the definition (2.5) of Ln+1(V ) that if (h3) is valid for some n ∈ N0, then
every sentence of Ln+1(V ) is true and not false by its meaning.
The first part of this proof shows that (h3) is valid when n = 0. Thus, by induction, it is
valid for all n ∈ N0. This result and (2.6) imply that every sentence of L(V ) is true and not
false by its meaning.
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Lemma 5.3. Assume that L0 is a language whose sentences have meanings which make them
either true or false, and has not a truth predicate. Then the language LT given in Definition
4.1 and interpreted by meanings of its sentences as in Lemma 5.1 has the following properties.
(a) If a sentence of LT is true in the interpretation (I), it is true and not false by its meaning.
(b) If a sentence of LT is false in the interpretation (I), it is false and not true by its meaning.
Proof. By Theorem 3.1 the smallest consistent subset U of D which satisfies U = G(U) is the
last member of the transfinite sequence (Uλ)λ<γ constructed in that Theorem. We prove by
transfinite induction that the following result holds for all λ < γ.
(H) Every sentence of LT whose Go¨del number is in Uλ is true and not false by its meaning.
Make the induction hypothesis: There exists a µ which satisfies 0 < µ < γ such that (H)
holds for all λ < µ.
Let λ < µ be given. Because Uλ is consistent and W ⊆ Uλ ⊆ U for every λ < µ, it follows
from the induction hypothesis and Lemma 3.3 that every sentence of L(Uλ) is true and not
false by its meaning. This implies by (3.1) that (H) holds when Uλ is replaced G(Uλ), for
every λ < µ. Thus (H) holds when Uλ is replaced by the union of those sets. But this union
is Uµ by Theorem 3.1 (G), whence (H) holds when λ = µ.
When µ = 1, then λ < µ iff λ = 0. U0 = W , i.e., the set of Go¨del numbers of true sentences of
L. Since L, interpreted by meanings of its sentences, is bivalent by Lemma 5.1, these sentences
are true and not false by their meanings. Moreover, these sentences are also sentences of LT ,
since it contains sentences of L. This proves that the induction hypothesis is satisfied when
µ = 1.
The above proof implies by transfinite induction, that properties assumed in (H) for Uλ are
valid whenever λ < γ. In particular, they are valid for the last member of (Uλ)λ<γ , which
is by Theorem 3.1 the smallest consistent subset U of D for which U = G(U). Thus every
sentence of LT , which is true in the interpretation (I), has its Go¨del number in U , and hence
by is the above proof true and not false by its meaning. This proves (a).
To prove (b), let A denote a sentence which is false in the interpretation (I). Negation rule
implies that ¬A is true in the interpretation (I). Thus, by (a), ¬A is true and not false by its
meaning, so that by the standard meaning of negation, A is false and not true by its meaning.
This proves (b).
The next result which is a consequence of Lemma 5.1, Lemma 5.3 and Theorem 5.1.
Proposition 5.1. Assume that L0 is a language whose sentences have meanings which make
them either true or false, and which has not a truth predicate. Then LT defined in Definition
4.1, and interpreted as in Lemma 5.1, is a language whose sentences have meanings which
make them either true or false. This interpretation is equivalent to the interpretation (I).
The theory of truth formulated in Theorem 5.1 is valid for LT also when its sentences are
interpreted by their meanings.
Proof. Let A denote a sentence of LT . A is by Lemma 4.1 either true or false in the interpre-
tation (I). If A is true in the interpretation (I), it is by Lemma 5.3 (a) true and not false by its
meaning. If A is false in the interpretation (I), it is by Lemma 5.3 (b) false and not true by its
meaning. Consequently, A is either true or false by its meaning. Thus every sentence of LT
is either true or false by its meaning, and this interpretation is by the above proof equivalent
to the interpretation (I). This equivalence implies the last conclusion of Proposition.
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6 Remarks
Results of Theorem 5.1 and Proposition 5.1 imply that the theory DSTT of truth formulated
in [4, Theorem 4.1] is valid for languages which conform to classical logic. Moreover, the other
results of [4, Section 4] are valid. In particular, the presented theory of truth conforms by [4,
Theorem 4.2] to the norms presented in [7] for theories of truth.
The family of those languages which conform to classical logic is considerably larger than
the families of those languages for which theory DSTT is formulated in [4]. For instance, an
object language can be any language whose sentences have meanings which make them either
true or false. Notice also that any language L0 which has properties (i) – (iii) conforms to
classical logic. In such a case L0 coincides with L. Thus any first-order language equipped
with a consistent theory interpreted by a countable model conforms to classical logic.
Object languages can have only a finite number of sentences. For example, let L0 be a
language formed by a sentence and its negation. If one of the sentences of L0 is interpreted as
true and the other one as false, then L0 conforms to classical logic. But if both sentences are
interpreted either as true or as false, then this interpretation contradicts with the negation
rule. Thus L0 does not conform to classical logic although it is bivalent.
The set U in the above formulated theory is the smallest consistent subset of D which satisfies
U = G(U). In other words, U is the minimal fixed point of G in C. Because every sentence of
LT is either true or false, the sentences of LT are grounded in the sense defined by Kripke in
[6, p. 18]. The language Lσ determined by the minimal fixed point in Kripke’s construction
contains also sentences which don’t have truth values. For instance, the sentence A↔ T (⌈A⌉)
has not a truth value for every sentence A of Lσ. Thus a three-valued logic is needed in [6],
as well as in [3]. In the present paper the only logic that is used is classical.
Some concepts dealing with predicates and their domains are revised from those used in [4]
so that they agree better with the corresponding concepts in informal languages of first-order
logic (cf. [1]). The result of [4, Theorem 6.1] is used in the proof of [4, Lemma 3.2] to show
that G(U) is consistent if U is consistent. This result is then used in the proof of [4, Lemma
6.2], and hence in the proof of [4, Theorem 6.1]. This circular reasoning is corrected in the
proof of Lemma 3.1. Moreover, the proof of Theorem 3.1 simplifies that of [4, Theorem 6.1].
Mathematics, especially set theory, plays a crucial role in this paper, as well as in [4]. Meta-
physical necessity of pure mathematical truths is considered in [8].
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